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ABSTRACT 
There are three essential I want to get across in this article in addition to the analysis of 
relations of nonlinguistic to linguistic intentionality. First I want to emphasize how the 
structure of prelinguistic intentionality enables us to solve the problems of the relation of 
reference and predication and the problem of the unity of the proposition. The second point 
is about deontology. The basic intellectual motivation that drives this second part of his 
argument is the following: there is something left out of the standard textbook accounts of 
language as consisting of syntax, semantics and phonology with an extra-linguistic 
pragmatics thrown in.  Basically what is left out is the essential element of commitment 
involved in having a set of conventional devices that encode the imposition of conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction.  The third part of the article is about the creation 
of a social and institutional ontology by linguistically representing certain facts as existing, 
thus creating the facts.  When we understand this third point we will get a deeper insight 
into the constitutive role of language in the construction of society and social institutions. 
 
 
1. Naturalizing Language 
 
I believe that the greatest achievements in philosophy over the past hundred 
or one hundred and twenty five years have been in the philosophy of language. 
Beginning with Frege, who invented the subject, and continuing through 
Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Austin and their successors, right to the present 
day, there is no branch of philosophy with so much high quality work as the 
philosophy of language. In my view, the only achievement comparable to 
those of the great philosophers of language is Rawls’s reinvention of the 
subject of political philosophy (and therefore implicitly the subject of ethics). 
But with this one possible exception, I think that work in the philosophy of 
language is at the top of our achievements.  
Having said that, however, I have to record a serious misgiving I have 
about the subject. The problem is that its practitioners in general do not treat 
language as a natural phenomenon. This may seem a strange charge to make, 
given that so many contemporary and recent philosophers of language are 
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anxious to emphasize the empirical character of their theories of language. 
Quine and Davidson are striking examples of resolute empiricism. My 
objection is that few contemporary and recent philosophers of language 
attempt to treat language as a natural extension of non-linguistic biological 
capacities. Language is not seen as continuous with, nor as an extension of, the 
rest of our specifically human biological inheritance. I think there is a deep 
reason, both historically and intellectually, why language has not been treated 
naturalistically. It is because the philosophy of language went hand in hand 
with the development of mathematical logic. Indeed, Frege, in effect, invented 
both the philosophy of language and modern logic. And the growth of the 
philosophy of language through Russell and the early Wittgenstein was very 
much seen as an application of mathematical logic. Even later Wittgenstein 
and Austin, both of whom reacted against the excessive logicism of the 
philosophy of language, did not see language as a natural biological 
phenomenon. It is not hard to think of language as an extension of biological 
capacities, but if by “logic” we mean formal systems of the sort developed by 
Frege and his successors, then logic is definitely not a biological phenomenon. 
On the contrary, specifically human biology existed for tens of thousands of 
years before logic in this sense was ever invented.  
What would it be like to try to treat language, in my sense, naturalistically? 
The first step would be one that many philosophers have resisted and that is 
to see linguistic meaning, the meaning of sentences and speech acts, as an 
extension of the more biologically fundamental forms of intentionality that we 
have in belief, desire, memory and intention, and to see those in turn as 
developments of even more fundamental forms of intentionality, especially, 
perception and intentional action. Among the most basic forms of 
intentionality, the most biologically primitive, along with hunger, thirst and 
sexual desire, are perception and intention-in-action. Given perceptions and 
actions, animals have the capacity to develop memories and prior intentions, 
as well as beliefs and desires and other forms of intentionality, such as 
expectation and fear, anger and aggression. I believe we should see the 
biological foundations of language in prelinguistic intentionality. Our initial 
question should be, What are the similarities and differences between the 
prelinguistic forms of consciousness and intentionality and the linguistic 
forms? We do not know how in fact language evolved, and in the absence of 
fossil evidence we may never know exactly how it evolved, but we do know 
that it did evolve, and we ought at least to be able to answer the question, 
What are the logical, conceptual relations between prelinguistic forms of 
consciousness and intentionality and the evolved linguistic forms?  
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I want to emphasize that this approach is quite different from the standard 
approaches. Davidson, for example, thought that only a being that has a 
language can have intentional states such as beliefs and desires. I think he had 
the biology exactly backwards. Many species of animals have perceptions, 
perform actions and are capable of acquiring beliefs, desires and intentions, 
though they have no language. Furthermore, several species are capable of 
prelinguistic thought processes. I suggest that we think of human language as 
an extension of these prelinguistic capacities. 
The aim of this article is to explain some of the essential features of human 
language, and I will emphasize especially those features of language that relate 
to human society. Notice I say “What is language?” and not “What is a 
language such as French, German or English?” I will not be interested in what 
makes one language distinct from others, but in what they all have in 
common. In addition to the naturalism urged in previous paragraphs, a second 
main theme of this article will be that the standard accounts of language in 
philosophy of language and linguistics tend to underestimate, and therefore 
misrepresent, the role of society and of social conventions. The general 
accounts of society given in such disciplines as sociology tend to 
underestimate, and therefore misrepresent, the special role of language in 
society. I will be arguing, among other things, that language is essentially 
social, but not just in any old way; rather, in a way that makes human society 
essentially linguistic. The key connecting link between language and society is 
the notion of deontology, a notion involving commitments of various kinds, 
about which I will say more later. Language, for reasons that I will attempt to 
state, requires a deontology, and the deontology introduced by language 
makes specifically human forms of society and human civilization possible.  
One of the essential questions addressed in this paper is this: Since human 
societies are importantly different from animal societies, which of those 
differences are accounted for, and how exactly are they accounted for, by the 
existence of human languages? 
 
 
2. Language as Phonology, Syntax and Semantics 
 
The standard textbook accounts of language say that specific languages such 
as French or German consist of three components: a phonological component 
that determines how words and sentences are pronounced, a syntactical 
component that determines the arrangement of words and morphemes in 
sentences, and a semantic component that assigns a meaning or interpretation 
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to words and sentences. More sophisticated accounts add that there must also 
be a pragmatic component that is not a component of specific languages; 
rather, it sets certain constraints on the use of language and is not internal to 
specific languages in the way that the syntax of French is internal to French 
and the syntax of German is internal to German. For our purposes we can 
ignore phonology because it is not essential to language that it be spoken. (It is 
important, however, that any language, whether spoken or not, must be 
thinkable. It is sometimes said that people think in words. Unless they are 
talking out loud to themselves, that is not true. They think in images of 
words.) The relation of syntax to semantics is however crucial. Syntax 
organizes semantics according to three principles: discreteness, 
compositionality and generativity. Discreteness is that feature by which 
syntactical elements retain their identity under the various syntactical 
operations. So, for example, when you change a sentence around, the words 
(and morphemes) do not lose their identity. Unlike baking a cake where the 
ingredients are changed by being mixed together, forming a sentence does not 
change the words and morphemes that are being mixed together; and you can 
have a sentence containing eight words or twelve words, but you cannot have 
a sentence containing nine and a half words. Compositionality is both a 
syntactic and a semantic property. Syntactically, a complex element such as a 
sentence is built up out of simple elements, words and morphemes, according 
to the formation rules of the language. Semantically, the meaning of the whole 
sentence is determined by the meanings of the simple elements together with 
the syntactical structure of the sentence. For example, we understand the 
sentence “John loves Mary” differently from the sentence “Mary loves John”; 
even though they both have the same elements, because the elements are 
arranged differently. Generativity, as I am using the term, implies that the 
syntactical operations of the language allow the speakers to generate an 
indefinite number of new sentences. There is, strictly speaking, no upper limit 
to the number of sentences in any natural human language.  
This account is OK as far as it goes but it is incomplete. I will be arguing 
that it leaves out a crucial dimension of language, namely the element of what 
in ordinary English we could describe as commitment and which I will describe 
more generally as deontology. Deontology is essential to the nature of human 
language in ways that I need to explain.  
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3. Society and Language  
 
In linguistics and philosophy, there is a more or less orthodox conception of 
language but there is no such commonality in social science accounts of 
society. It seems to me that the accounts of society that I am familiar with, 
ranging all the way from Aristotle to the present, radically misconceive the 
role of language in that, in an important sense, they take the existence of 
language for granted and then ask: How does society work, how is it 
constructed?, and so on. When I say that they take language for granted, I 
mean that in accounting for the nature of society they do not ask: What is 
language? Rather, they simply assume the existence of language and go on 
from there. Perhaps the worst offenders in this regard are the Social Contract 
theorists, who presuppose beings like us, who have language, and then ask 
how these beings could form society on the basis of a social contract. The point 
I will be making is that once a society has a common language, it already has a 
social contract. The situation with authors such as Bourdieu, Foucault and 
Habermas is not really better. They think of themselves as acutely conscious 
of language and its importance for society, but they do not ask, What is 
language? in a way that would enable them to ask, How exactly is language 
constitutive of society? 
 
 
4. What does Language Add to Prelinguistic Cognition?  
 
I am not sure how best to argue for the theses that I want to maintain. I think 
one way to argue for them is, so to speak, genetically. I propose to treat the 
question as an engineering or designer question. Imagine that there was a 
species like us, having a full range of prelinguistic conscious experiences, 
voluntary actions, and prelinguistic thought processes, but no language. What 
capacities would they have to have in order to create language for themselves 
and what exactly are they creating when they create a rudimentary language? 
At one time, animals more or less like us, hominids, walked the earth without 
language. Now we have language. What happened in between? And when I 
ask what happened, I do not mean the question historically, but conceptually. 
What conceptual (logical, cognitive) capacities did they acquire when they 
acquired language? And what sorts of cognitive capacities did they have 
beforehand on which language could have evolved? We have a language in a 
sense that other species do not. What is it that we have and how could we 
have gotten it? I must emphasize that I am not trying to do speculative 
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evolutionary biology, rather I am trying to do a logical analysis of the 
relations between prelinguistic cognitive capacities and language, with the aim 
of figuring out what language is.  
In response to earlier drafts of this article, some people thought I was 
trying to enter into current discussions of animal cognition and the actual 
evolution of language. That is a misunderstanding. I am, to repeat, not 
engaging in speculative evolutionary biology nor animal cognition. There is 
currently a sizable amount of research on animal cognition(1) and important 
work is done on the evolution of language.(2) I am not addressing the 
empirical issues in these fields. For comparison I will sometimes make 
reference to other animals, but if it should turn out that everything we 
currently believe, for example, about bee languages and primate thought 
processes is false, that would be only marginally relevant to my questions. 
And even if it should turn out that some animals have full blown languages in 
the sense that we do, and that human language did not gradually evolve but 
was the result of a single evolutionary Big Bang that produced brains with full 
blown generative grammars, such facts would be only marginally relevant to 
the questions I am asking about logical dependencies. I am emphatically not 
arguing for the superiority of our species. If it should turn out that some other 
animals have what we have, I welcome them to the club.  
When I ask the question, “How could language have evolved?” I mean 
something quite different from empirical researchers who ask a different 
question using the same sentence. They are asking: Given what we know about 
human evolutionary history and animal cognition, how could human 
languages have developed in our evolutionary history? My question is 
conceptual. Subtract language from a species like us: What do you have? Now 
add language: What are you adding?  
Notice that the way I am posing the question presupposes that the nature 
of language and the question of the functions and uses of language by human 
speakers cannot be separated. We can explore which structural features of 
language are useful or even essential, by exploring what use humans make of 
these structures.  
There are apparently intermediate cases between humans and species that 
communicate but do not have language in a human sense. The bees are the 
best known example. When a bee returns to the hive she performs a waggle 
dance that conveys different types of information depending on the variations 
in the dance. She conveys that there is nectar in the neighborhood, that it is in 
a certain direction and that it is a certain distance away from the hive. In hot 
weather, she can communicate the location of water, and even, during 
swarming, the location of possible hive sites. Different combinations of the 
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elements of the dance convey different elements of information. In one 
experiment, the experimenters towed a boatful of flowers to the middle of a 
lake. The returning bee conveyed this information. Her hive mates showed no 
interest in flying to what apparently they knew to be the middle of a lake.  
I will proceed by addressing four specific questions: What features of 
language are already present in prelinguistic consciousness ? What features of 
language are lacking in prelinguistic consciousness? What special features of 
consciousness are lacking in language? What functions do humans need 
language to perform, given prelinguistic consciousness?  
 
 
5. Features Common to Prelinguistic Intentionality and Language 
 
I have already said that the hominids have conscious perceptions and 
intentional actions together with conscious thought processes, all of these in a 
prelinguistic form. This implies, at the very least, that the animals have 
beliefs, desires, intentions, and at least some form of memories, enough to 
enable them to recognize familiar objects and situations.  
These prelinguistic forms of intentionality already have some crucial 
logical properties. Specifically, because perceptions, intentions, beliefs, desires, 
and so on, are forms of intentionality, they carry within them the 
determination of conditions of success or failure. An animal that is hungry, for 
example, has a desire to eat; and pathologies apart, it thus has the capacity to 
recognize when that desire is satisfied and when it is not satisfied. We can 
generalize this point as follows: Any intentional state determines its conditions 
of satisfaction, and a normal animal that has intentional states must be able to 
recognize when the conditions of satisfaction are in fact satisfied. If it is 
thirsty, it must be able to tell when it has drunk; if it is hungry, it must be 
able to tell when it has eaten; if it is trying to do something, it must know 
when it has done it, and so on. We can summarize this point by saying that 
when we supposed that our animals had intentional states we were already 
supposing that they had mental representations with propositional contents 
and conditions of satisfaction. But when I say that, I am speaking logically 
not ontologically. I am not saying the animals had a set of picture-like or 
sentence-like entities in their heads called “representations”. Rather, to have 
beliefs and desires, for example, is already to have something that determines 
conditions of satisfaction, and that implies the capacity to recognize success 
and failure. Presumably these capacities are realized in neuronal structures, 
but, for our investigation, it does not matter how these capacities are realized, 
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provided only that the realization is rich enough to carry the logical 
properties. When I say the representations are propositional, I imply nothing 
linguistic. I mean that there is something that sets the conditions of 
satisfaction; and because a condition is always a condition that such and such, 
it follows trivially that the conditions are propositional.  
We can summarize the formal features of intentionality, prelinguistic as 
well as linguistic, by explaining the following notions and the relations 
between them: propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, psychological 
mode and direction of fit. Our evolutionary history has given us different ways 
in which our mental states relate to reality. The aim of beliefs is to represent 
how things are, therefore beliefs can be said to be true or false. The aim of 
desires and intentions is not to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be. For this reason, desires and 
intentions are not true or false, but fulfilled or frustrated. I find it useful to 
characterize beliefs as having the mind-to-world direction of fit (the belief in the 
mind is supposed to fit the state of affairs in the world) and desires and 
intentions as having the world-to-mind direction of fit (if all goes well with the 
desires and intentions, the world comes to fit how it is represented in the 
mind). Not surprisingly these distinctions carry over exactly to speech acts. 
The assertive class of speech acts: statements, assertions, etc., are expressions 
of beliefs and are supposed, like beliefs, to represent how the world is and thus 
they have the word-to-world direction of fit. The directive class of speech acts: 
requests, orders, commands, etc., are expressions of desires and so have the 
world-to-word direction of fit. The commissive class: promises, offers, etc., are 
expressions of intention and so have the world-to-word direction of fit. These 
different directions of fit are a function not of the propositional content, by 
itself, but of how the propositional content is presented in the speech act. This 
is why in standard speech act notation, the total speech act is represented with 
a distinction between the illocutionary force, or type, of speech act and the 
propositional content. 
Thus  
F(p) 
represents the propositional content p, presented with the illocutionary 
force F. 
And this corresponds exactly to the representation of the intentional state as  
S(p) 
The “p” represents the propositional content and the “S” represents the 
type of intentional state, that is, its psychological mode, whether belief, desire, 
or whatever.  
. Our question is: How do we get from the intentional state S(p) to the 
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linguistic resources that would enable us to perform the speech act F(p)? Our 
task is made easier by the fact that the formal apparatus of the content and 
type, together with conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit, are already 
present in prelinguistic intentionality. 
So far so good. But what about those speech acts where the fit is taken for 
granted: expressives, such as apologizing and thanking? If you look at the 
forms of intentionality that correspond to these speech acts, and are expressed 
in their performance, forms such as regret and gratitude, it seems to me these 
typically are combinations of beliefs and desires. That is, they are forms of 
desire based on the presupposition of the truth of the belief.(3) For example if 
I regret having done something I must believe I did it and wish I had not. So 
the existence of speech acts where the fit is presupposed, which have what I 
have called the null direction of fit, does not pose an insuperable problem for 
moving from prelinguistic intentionality to speech acts, because the 
prelinguistic forms also include cases where the fit is presupposed. These cases, 
such as pride and shame, gratitude and regret, contain beliefs and desires, 
which do have a mind-world or world-mind direction of fit. 
In addition to the problem of expressive speech acts there is a special 
problem about declarations, speech acts that make something the case by 
declaring it to be the case, for example, adjourning a meeting by saying. “The 
meeting is adjourned”. Declarations have both directions of fit 
simulataneously because they make something the case by representing it as 
being the case. I cannot exaggerate the importance of this phenomenon for 
answering the question that poses the title of this paper. These have no echo in 
prelinguistic thought, and I will discuss them further in this article. 
The categories. Another feature of prelinguistic consciousness — and this 
will prove crucial for the evolution of language — is that any animal that has 
the biologically primitive intentional apparatus of conscious prelinguistic 
hominids already has a hefty number of the traditional philosophical (e.g. 
Aristotelian and Kantian) categories. It already has space, time, causation, 
agency and object; and with object it has to have identity and individuation 
together with property and relation. I do not mean that it has to have concepts 
corresponding to these categories, but rather, for example, that it has to be 
able to recognize that one object is over there in front of it and another one on 
the left (space), it has to recognize that its eating occurred in a temporal 
sequence (time), that it did something, as opposed to something just 
happening (agency), that some things it did, made other things happen 
(causation). Perhaps most importantly, if it can perceive and recognize objects 
including other hominids, it must have identity and individuation, because it 
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must be able to perceive that this is the same object as before (identity), and 
that this object is a separate object from that object (individuation). But once 
it has objects, with their identity and individuation, it already has properties 
and relations of objects. It can see that this person is next to that person (a 
spatial relation) and it can see that this object is brown (property). Given all of 
this apparatus, it also has the category of change; thus it can see that this 
hominid, who was previously over there, has now moved over here (change 
from one location to another of the same object). Finally, it can recognize 
objects of the same type. For example it can recognize other animals as being 
or not being of the same species as itself.  
 
 
6. Features of Language that Consciousness Lacks  
 
What does prelinguistic consciousness lack? Perhaps above all, it lacks internal 
and controllable structures in its thought processes. Thus a dog can perceive 
and hence think that, as we would put it, “Someone is approaching the door”. 
But, unlike us, it cannot distinguish that thought from the thought, “The door 
is being approached by someone”. Furthermore it cannot use its true thought, 
“Someone is approaching the door” to form the false thought “The door is 
approaching someone.” This is an important point. Prelinguistic forms of 
intentionality have structure, but they do not have the sorts of indefinitely 
manipulatable structures with semantic content that the syntax of language 
provides. Thus perception is structured by the sheer physical impact of the 
objects perceived and by the physiology of the perceptual apparatus. For 
example, the animal sees a man walk toward the door. The structure of 
memory is similarly shaped by the sheer physical events and the physiological 
apparatus. But without syntactical elements the animal does not have a rich 
structural apparatus the elements of which it can manipulate at will in an 
indefinite number of ways. Birds can perform new permutations of their songs, 
and an animal constructing a tool can distinguish removing the leaves from 
the twig and removing the twig from the leaves. Neither of these cases is, in 
my sense, a case of freely manipulating syntactic structures with semantic 
content. The beauty of human languages is not just that they have 
compositionality and generativity but the user can freely manipulate the 
semantically loaded syntactical elements at will. 
I think that what I just said is obviously true but it is controversial. Some 
philosophers, especially Fodor,(4) think that all thought requires a linguistic 
syntax, and that humans can acquire a natural language only because they 
already have an inborn “language of thought” with a syntax as rich as that of 
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any human language. Others, especially Davidson,(5) believe that without 
language thought is impossible. So, they, incredibly, deny that animals can 
have intentional states such as beliefs and desires. I, on the contrary, think 
that it is obvious that many animals, my dog Gilbert for example, have 
perceptions, intentions, beliefs and desires, and yet they have nothing like a 
language with freely manipulatable syntactical structure. And even if I am 
wrong about Gilbert, there is just too much biological evidence of animal 
cognition to make Davidson’s view credible.(6) 
 Structure and Segmentation. Another difference between the linguistic 
and the prelinguistic is that the flow of consciousness in prelinguistic thought 
and perception, though structured in all sorts of ways, does not, or does not 
necessarily, come in discrete segments in the way that language does. Non 
linguistic thought is, or at least can be, a continuous flow, broken only by 
sleep or other forms of non-consciousness. Language, however, is essentially 
segmented. The utterance of sentences cannot be a continuous 
undifferentiated flow, but each sentence, and even each sentence fragment, if 
uttered as a complete speech act, must be discrete. So the situation we are in 
when we move from experience to language is analogous to the situation where 
we move from a movie to a series of still pictures. By thinking in language we 
break up our thought into words and sentential segments. Though actual 
discourse takes place in time, the intentionality of the discourse is in discrete 
segments in a way that the flow of prelinguistic thought and perception in 
action in conscious life is not in that way in discrete segments. A typical 
speech act, though performed in time, is, semantically speaking, 
instantaneous. This is why it does not matter to the identity of the speech act 
whether, for example, the language spoken requires that the verb phrase 
comes before or after the subject noun phrase. This difference between 
unsegmented consciousness and segmented discourse is disguised from us, or at 
least, for a long time was disguised from me, by the fact that beliefs and 
desires are naturally talked about as if they were discrete units. But when they 
are, so to speak, in action, when I am actually looking or acting or perceiving, 
then they become part of the continuous flow. Suppose, for example, I have 
the following thought in English, “Now I have to go because it is time for 
dinner.” Though that thought occurs in time, because it is expressed in an 
English sentence it has a kind of discreteness that pre-linguistic thoughts do 
not have. If, for example, I am dancing or skiing, the stream of conscious 
thought need not contain any words and can be in a continuous flow.  
Declarations. A third special feature of language that does not exist in 
prelinguistic intentionality is that in language we get a type of speech act that 
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I have baptized “declarations.” These have a double direction of fit, both 
word-to-world and world-to-word in the same speech act. These are not two 
independent fittings but one fitting that goes both ways. Consider the cases 
where, for example, an authorized person adjourns the meeting, or declares 
war, by saying “The meeting is adjourned” or “War is declared.” Or consider 
linguistic declarations where somebody makes a promise by saying “I 
promise” or gives an order by saying “I order.” These are performative 
utterances; and all performatives are declarations (though not all declarations 
are performatives). In these cases we have the double direction of fit, because 
we make something the case, and thus achieve the world-to-word direction of 
fit, by representing it as being the case, that is by representing it with the 
word-to-world direction of fit. This is one of the most important powers of 
language, the power to create a reality by declaring it to exist. There is 
nothing analogous to that in pre-linguistic forms of intentionality so we need 
to be able to show how an extension of the prelinguistic forms to language 
gives us the capacity to create forms of institutional or social reality that exist 
only because we collectively and linguistically represent them as existing. We 
need to show how prelinguistic forms of intentionality could have evolved into 
human social and institutional reality. What we will require in order to 
explain this evolution is the notion of meaning and the notion of a convention. 
I will get to these shortly 
 
 
7. Some Special Features of Consciousness: The Unity of the Proposition and the 
Salience of Objects with their Features 
 
In explaining the transition from prelinguistic intentionality to linguistic 
intentionality, we have some wonderful resources in consciousness that go 
beyond the possession of the apparatus of intentionality and the various 
philosophical categories – space, time, causation, identity, etc. — that I 
mentioned in section V. Specifically, in prelinguistic intentionality the 
problem of the unity of the proposition does not arise. Why? Because the 
sequence of conscious thought and experience is one where the representation 
of the conditions of satisfaction is built in at every step of the way. There is no 
problem about how I can put the elements of my experience together to form a 
unity in a way that there is a problem about how I can put discrete words 
together to form a unified sentence. The experience comes with unity built 
into it. In conscious hunger, thirst, and visual perception, for example, the 
determination of the conditions of satisfaction is internal to the experience. 
Another resource that we have is that the actual structure of our conscious, 
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perceptual experiences makes objects with their features salient. We 
consciously see, and otherwise perceive, distinct objects and their properties. 
We see, for example, tall trees, ripe apples and snow covered mountains.  
The combination of the unity of the proposition and the salience of some 
features of our experience gives us an apparent paradox, but I think it is a 
paradox we can resolve. Our experiences give us a built in unity corresponding 
to the unity of the proposition in language, but at the same time our 
experiences give us distinct objects and their features as salient, and this 
corresponds to the noun-phrase verb-phrase structure in language. How do 
these two apparently inconsistent features relate to each other? We can only 
succeed in seeing when we see that something is the case, see that such and such. 
But all the same we do see objects, we see that object. I will attempt to resolve 
this apparent paradox in section X.  
Another way to put the problem is this. It is easy enough to imagine a 
language which segments objects differently from the way we do, which treats 
a tree not as a unified whole, but as a top half and a bottom half. And has 
separate words for each. That is certainly a logical possibility. It is also 
possible to imagine a language that does not allow reference to objects, but 
only to processes as states of affairs. We could imagine a language where 
instead of saying, “That’s a tree,” or “That’s a stone”, we could say “It’s 
treeing here” or “It’s stoning here,” on analogy with “It’s raining here” or 
“It’s snowing here,” where the “it” does not refer to any object. We could 
imagine such a language, but such a language, if it exists, runs counter to our 
perceptual phenomenology. Our existing perceptual apparatus is constructed 
so that we naturally treat spatio-temporally discrete entities as single units, 
and these are represented by typical noun phrases of our language. 
Furthermore, identity as preserved in memory is crucial to the development of 
reference over time, because a pre-linguistic animal can nonetheless recognize 
the same object on different occasions, and recognize the same object as 
having different features on different occasions. The paradox I mentioned 
earlier is that the unit necessarily represented by an intentional state is a 
whole state of affairs, not an object. Yet perceptually objects and not states of 
affairs are phenomenologically salient. In language the problem is to explain 
the unity of the proposition, given the separate syntactical representation of 
reference and predication. 
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8. The Functions of Language: Representation versus Expression 
 
So far, I have attempted to answer three questions concerning (1) features 
common to language and consciousness, (2) features special to language and 
(3) features special to consciousness.  
We now go to the last of our four questions. For what primary functions 
do we need language? By primary functions I mean those functions that are 
essential to something’s being a language at all. We have to specify the 
primary functions before we can explain the structures which are necessary 
and sufficient to perform those functions.  
The first primary function is this: we need language to provide a 
mechanism by which our critters can communicate with each other. What 
does “communicate” mean? And what gets communicated? The standard 
answer to the second question is that in speaking we communicate 
information. But “information” is one of the most confused and ill defined 
notions in contemporary intellectual life. So I am wary of using it except 
incidentally. I will just state flatly that what typically gets communicated in 
speech acts are intentional states, and the point of doing that is that the 
intentional states already represent the world; so what gets communicated, by 
way of communicating intentional states, is typically information about the 
world. If I communicate to you my belief that it is raining, the point is 
typically not to tell you about me and my beliefs, but about the weather. But 
there is no way I can intentionally tell you something about the weather 
except by way of using my mental representations of the weather, my weather 
directed intentional states, such as my beliefs.  
Our prelinguistic hominids already have perception, intentional action and 
prelinguistic thought processes. All of these are intentional states with full 
propositional contents. And when one such creature intentionally 
communicates to another, it tries to reproduce its own intentional content in 
the head of the other person. When it communicates, for example, “there is 
danger here” it has the belief that there is danger here and it acts in such a 
way as to convey this belief to another animal. 
 The simplest type of communication would be the cases where one 
animal communicates information about the world by communicating an 
unstructured proposition to another animal. By unstructured I mean that the 
propositional content so far has no internal syntax. There is nothing there 
corresponding to the words of natural languages. This type of communication 
is already very common among animals. Think of warning cries of birds, 
mating calls of all sorts of species, and even some dogs’ barks. All such 
examples are cases of what Peter Strawson(7) once called “feature placing.” 
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We simply communicate the presence of a feature in the environment. In 
actual languages these feature placing utterances can often be done with one 
word. “Danger!” “ Rain!” “Fire!” And when we expand one of these into a 
whole sentence, the other parts of the sentence are sometimes semantically 
empty, as we when we say “It is raining” though there is nothing referred to 
by “it”. Such simple cases of intentional communication do indeed transfer an 
intentional content from one animal to another, but they are a very small step 
on the road to real language because they are so limited. The fact that all sorts 
of animals have this kind of communication should tell us that it is not yet 
linguistic, or anything like it. 
 We might say that the first step on the road to language would be to 
introduce conventional devices for communicating intentional contents from 
one animal to another.  
In most of the cases we considered the animals already have natural devices 
for the communication, but we can easily imagine that our hominids develop 
conventional devices for intentional states that have no natural external 
expression. A dog does not need a conventional device to convey aggression. It 
can just bark aggressively. But humans, for example, do not in that way have 
a natural way of conveying the fact that it is raining. Such reflections about 
the distinction between natural ways of conveying intentional states, and 
evolved conventional ways, will I think force us to distinguish representation 
from expression. We need to distinguish between those communicative acts 
that involve intentionally representing a state of affairs in the world and those 
that simply express (in the original sense of pressing out, of giving vent to) an 
animal’s internal state, where that expression may convey information about 
the world but it does not do so by representing that something is the case, or 
by representing other sorts of conditions of satisfaction. Thus if I say “Rain!” 
I represent the weather even if the representation is unstructured. But if I say 
“Ouch!” as a spontaneous expression of pain, I convey information but I do 
not represent anything. Let us now make a generalization that will make our 
task clearer: Simple expressive speech acts, even when performed 
intentionally, are not “linguistic” in the sense we are trying to make explicit, 
and the corresponding words of actual languages are not “words” in our sense. 
Ouch! Damn! Yuck! Wow! are all used to express mental states, both 
intentional and nonintentional, but they are not the kind of linguistic 
phenomena we are trying to explain. Why not? Because, though they give 
vent to intentional or other states of the speaker, they do not represent. What 
we want to understand is, how can our hominids evolve linguistic 
representation? 
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What is the difference exactly between representing and expressing? If I 
say “Rain!” my utterance can be literally true or false, because it represents 
the current state of the weather. I can, for example, lie when I make this 
utterance. But if I say “Ouch!” though I do convey information about myself, 
I say nothing which is literally true or false. If I say “Ouch” when I am not in 
pain I may mislead and misinform, but I do not lie.(8)  
So the first thing our hominids have to create are some conventional 
devices for representing the same states of affairs in the world that their 
existing intentional states represent. One type of such a device would 
represent the same state of affairs, the same conditions of satisfaction, as 
“there is food here”, another, “It is dangerous here”, another, “it is raining”, 
etc. By producing a token of such a device, in what we might as well call “an 
utterance”, a person can convey to another person the same content as he has 
in his existing intentional state. For example, he believes it is raining, so he 
produces the appropriate device to his interlocutor and thus communicates 
that it is raining.  
There is a lot of philosophical weight contained in this simple story so let us 
slow down and go over it one step at a time. We are assuming that the 
prelinguistic people can recognize tokens of the same type. That is a 
reasonable assumption because the cognitive apparatus we assumed they came 
endowed with, implies a capacity for recognizing exemplars of the same on 
different occasions. We assume that the speaker is able to utter a token 
intentionally. That is implied by his stipulated capacity for intentional 
behavior. But now what exactly is added when he utters the device for 
purposes of communication? Well, he already has an intentional state with 
conditions of satisfaction, for example, the belief that it is raining. So what he 
does, is intentionally impose these conditions of satisfaction on the utterance. 
The utterance now has the same conditions of satisfaction as his belief, and 
since we are supposing that he and his hearer both know the convention for 
using the symbol in question, he can make the utterance with confidence that 
the hearer will recognize that it has those conditions of satisfaction.  
The introduction of conventional devices for representing states of affairs 
already presupposes the notion of speaker meaning. Any agent who is capable 
of using those devices must be able to use them meaningfully.  
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9. Speaker Meaning as the Imposition of Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
 
We can now clarify the notion of meaning. We need to distinguish between the 
conventional meaning of words, sentences and other symbols, and the speaker 
meaning which the speaker expresses in making an intentional utterance. In 
the case we have discussed, the symbol in question has a conventional 
meaning: it is raining, and when the speaker makes an utterance with this 
symbol he expresses a speaker meaning, a speech act meaning: it is raining. 
When the speaker intentionally utters a token of the symbol, the production of 
the token is the condition of satisfaction of his intention to utter it. And when 
he utters it meaningfully he is imposing a further condition of satisfaction on 
the token uttered. The condition of satisfaction is: That it is raining. That 
intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction is the essence of speaker meaning.  
The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. 
It requires the ability to think two levels at once, in a way that is essential for 
the use of language. At one level the speaker intentionally produces a physical 
utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. And the 
same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it is a physical token like 
any other, at another level it has a meaning, it represents a type of a state of 
affairs. 
There are two separate aspects to what I have said so far. First, speaker 
meaning consists in the double level of intentionality I have tried to describe. 
The speaker intentionally produces an utterance, and he intends that the 
utterance should itself have conditions of satisfaction, for example truth 
conditions. But, and this is the next crucial point, if he is to succeed on a 
regular basis, then there has to be some socially recognized conventional device, 
some repeatable device, the production of which can be regularly and 
conventionally taken by his interlocutors to convey the message. Now we are 
getting much closer to language, because the first phenomenon is essential to 
the performance of speech acts, and the second phenomenon, the repeatable 
devices, consist typically of words and sentences of a language. 
For the sake of explanatory simplicity, I introduced the idea of a 
convention before that of speaker meaning. But which really comes first, 
speaker meaning or convention? In the order of logical dependence the speaker 
intentionality must be logically prior, because these conventions for 
unstructured propositions encode preexisting speaker meanings. However, 
without language and its conventions you can only have very simple speaker 
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meanings. You can think, and mean, for example: It is raining here. But you 
cannot even think, much less say and mean, for example, “It would be nice to 
visit the zoo next Sunday but I have to stay home and work on my income 
tax.” We will get to this point, the dependence of complex thought and 
meaning on language, in the next section when we get to symbols that have a 
compositional structure. For now I will just remark: if the speakers and 
hearers are to evolve a system where they can communicate effectively, they 
will have to develop a set of conventional devices for conveying speaker 
meaning. 
When our animals develop a language, they are developing a set of devices 
for public, social, representation. That means they develop a set of devices, the 
production of which will be the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction, by convention.  
This is a first step on the way to language, but only a first step because so 
far we do not have syntax. The devices we were imagining correspond to 
unstructured propositions, and have no internal syntactical structure. In 
English we would have to translate them as one word sentences: Rain! Danger! 
Food! etc. 
 
 
10. A Further Step: Syntactical Compositionality 
 
A further step on the road to language (and remember, the metaphor of 
“steps” implies nothing historical — I am speaking of logical components, I 
have no idea in which order they occurred historically) is the introduction of 
simple syntactical devices which can be combined with other syntactical 
devices to produce complex syntactical devices, and each one of the complex 
devices will be used to communicate an entire intentional state. That is 
another way of saying that the hominids need to evolve elements that 
correspond to our words and morphemes and to ways of combining these into 
sentences in a compositional manner, in a way that enables the participants to 
figure out the meaning of the sentences from the meanings of the elements and 
their arrangement in the sentence. For us the minimal unit of communication, 
the minimal unit of the speech act, is the whole sentence. The principle that 
guides the selection of the syntactical devices within the sentence is that they 
must perform a semantic function. There must be repeatable devices each of 
which can function as a possible communication unit (sentence) and these 
must be composed of elements (words) which are such that the communicative 
content of the whole is determined by the elements and by the principles of 
their combination in the sentence.  
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How do we introduce these features — words and sentences — where the 
sentences are systematically built out of the words? We have to build on the 
resources that the animal already has, and these are in fact quite rich. Because 
our beasts already have the capacity to identify and re-identify objects, we 
can introduce names of objects, and because they have the capacity to 
recognize different tokens of the same type, we can introduce such general 
names as ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘man’ etc., and because the objects have features, we can 
introduce something corresponding to adjectives and verbs. But notice the 
crucial constraints on these. We are not assuming that reference and 
predication, the speech acts corresponding to noun phrases and verb phrases, 
are in any way simple independent elements, but rather that once we have the 
total speech act we can abstract these as component elements. Following 
Frege, we think of the nouns phrases and verb phrases as derived from the 
total sentence and not the total sentence as arrived at by combining nouns 
phrases and verb phrases.  
What does that mean? Our animals already have unstructured 
propositional contents. But corresponding to these are structured features of 
the real world and the animals have the capacity to recognize these structures 
and their elements. So we are not begging any questions when we give the 
animal a sentential structure that corresponds to the conditions of satisfaction 
that it already has. The semantic function comes for free because we have 
already introduced meaning. Here is the basic idea: The animal has perceptual 
and belief contents that lack syntactic structure: It can see, and therefore 
believe, something that we can report (but the animal cannot report) as “It is 
coming toward me”. Now if the animal has the capacity to create meaningful 
events, i.e. speech acts, then it can already represent this state of affairs with 
the double level intentionality that I described earlier. From the animal’s 
point of view the representation might be of the form: “Coming-toward-me-
thing-now”, where we are to think of this so far as if it were one word, without 
repeatable elements. 
The animal has feature placing, but not yet reference and predication. To 
get reference and predication it needs symbolic devices that break up the 
propositional content into components. But it already has the material to 
construct those components from its prelinguistic intentionality. It can see 
something coming toward it now, and thus believe that something is coming 
toward it now. But that is enough to give us at least the possibility of 
introducing devices that can perform the functions of reference and 
predication, devices that are forms of noun phrases and verb phrases. We will 
add rules or procedures for arranging those devices (words) into the complex 
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resultant structures (sentences). It does not much matter how we construct 
these subsentential elements or how we combine them as long as they break up 
the sentence into repeatable components, and as long as the components 
match the components of the prelinguistic intentional contents. I have been 
assuming that they are broken up in a style similar to European languages I 
know, but that is not a necessary assumption. I have been assuming that the 
presyntactical coming-toward-me-thing-now breaks up into a device which 
refers to a contextually specific object, such as a man, and the predication of 
coming toward me now, as in the English 
The man is coming toward me now. 
It is not logically necessary that it be done this way, but doing it this way 
fits our prelinguistic phenomenology better than some ways we can imagine. 
As I said earlier, we can imagine a language where what we think of as objects 
are treated as recurring and repeatable processes, so it would come out as 
It is manning now towards me comingly. 
on analogy with  
It is raining now on me heavily. 
But such a language would not reflect the object salience of our perceptual 
phenomenology. 
Furthermore there are built-in structural features of human intentionality 
which carry the solution to the paradox I mentioned earlier, and any 
evolutionary account has to face this paradox. The paradox is: how do we 
achieve the unity of the sentence (and hence the unity of the expressed 
proposition) when the sentence is entirely composed of discrete entities, the 
string of words and morphemes that constitute it? A related second question 
is: How do we explain the pervasiveness of noun phrases and verb phrases in 
human languages, and how doe we explain that typically sentences contain 
both noun phrases and verb phrases? The solution to the first problem, the 
unity of the proposition, is provided by the fact that, because of the nature of 
speaker meaning, it is a requirement on something’s being a sentence at all 
capable of encoding a speaker meaning that it must encode an entire 
intentional state. All intentionality, conscious or unconscious, perceptual or 
nonperceptual, comes to us propositionally in the trivial sense that each 
discriminable intentional state has conditions of satisfaction and a condition is 
always that such and such is the case. The sentence is designed to encode the 
entire propositional content of the intentional state. So once we require that 
sentences encode whole intentional states, the unity of the proposition 
expressed comes for free. The unity of the proposition is built into the very 
logical structure of biological intentionality.  
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Now we turn to the second question. If we now look at the 
phenomenological structure of our experiences, particularly conscious, 
perceptual experience, we will see that objects and their features are salient. 
Though the conditions of satisfaction of our visual experiences require whole 
states of affairs, so that we never just see an object, but, for example, we see 
that an object with such and such features is over there; all the same, 
phenomenologically, we are aware of seeing objects and seeing that they have 
such and such features. So the propositional unity expressed by the complete 
sentence is already provided by prelinguistic intentionality, and the internal 
subject-predicate structure is provided by the way our phenomenology 
presents the propositional content to us. 
So far then we have taken three steps on the road to language: first the 
creation of speaker meaning, that is, the imposition of conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. Second, the creation of conventional 
devices for performing acts of speaker meaning, which gives us something 
approaching sentence meaning, where sentence meaning is the standing 
possibility of speaker meaning. Sentence meaning is conventionalized. Speaker 
meaning is typically the employment or use of those conventions in the 
performance of the speech act. Third, we have added internal structure to the 
speech act in the form of discriminable syntactic elements that have meanings, 
semantic content, but cannot stand on their own in utterances. They are parts 
of sentences, and thus correspond to words, but they are not yet whole 
sentences. We also need rules for combining these devices into whole sentences 
and distinguishing between grammatical and ungrammatical strings. Both of 
these are crucial to any account of language. The first gives us meaningful 
units big enough to function in communication, the second gives 
compositionality. The sentence is composed of meaningful elements and those 
meaningful elements together with their rules of combination enable us to 
generate new sentences and to figure out the meanings of sentences and 
utterances that we have never heard before.  
We do not yet have generativity, that is the capacity of speakers to 
produce and understand a potentially infinite number of new sentences, but it 
is easy to add generativity to compositionality by simply adding some 
recursive rules, rules that apply over and over endlessly. Examples of ways of 
providing generativity are such expressions as “It is possible that,” “Sally 
believes that” or rules for forming relative clauses. What about sentence 
connectives? They do not seem hard to add either. Indeed we already have an 
implicit sentence connective when we conjoin two sentences in the speech act. 
If I say “It is raining. I am hungry” I have already said something equivalent 
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to “it is raining and I am hungry” And we can add explicit connectives to do 
these jobs, connectives corresponding to the English “and” “or” “if…then” 
and “not”.  
Notice that with the addition of linguistic syntax to animal intentionality 
we enable speakers to do something no nonlinguistic animal can do. The 
speaker can intentionally construct arbitrarily many different representations 
of actual, possible and even impossible states of affairs in the world. The 
speaker can now think and say not only the man is coming toward me now, 
but the man will come toward me next week, or the mountain will come 
toward me, and so on endlessly. 
With the apparatus so far developed the hominids can extend the 
vocabulary to enable them to think thoughts and perform speech acts that are 
literally unthinkable without language. The prelinguistic animal can count on 
his fingers. Given numerals, initially introduced to match the fingers, he can 
count indefinitely and have thoughts with numerical components that he 
cannot have in the prelinguistic form. Without language he might think, 
“There are three dogs in the field,” but with language he can think, “I wish 
there were a thousand dogs in the field.” 
 
 
11. The Next Step: Deontology 
 
So with meaning conventions plus compositionality and generativity we are 
well on the road to language.  
Why is that not enough? Why are we just on the road and not already 
there? I think there is a sense in which we are already there if we understand 
the implications of the account that I have given so far in a certain very 
specific way. It is essential to see that in the account I have given so far it is 
implicit that the speaker employing the conventional device in a social setting 
for the purpose, for example, of conveying some truth about the world to the 
hearer, is thereby committed to that truth. That is, we will not understand an 
essential feature of language if we do not see that it necessarily involves social 
commitments, and that the necessity of these social commitments derives from 
the social character of the communication situation, the conventional 
character of the devices used, and the intentionality of speaker meaning. It is 
this feature that enables language to form the foundation of human society in 
general. If a speaker intentionally conveys information to a hearer using 
socially accepted conventions for the purpose of producing a belief in the 
hearer about a state of affairs in the world, then the speaker is committed to 
the truth of his utterance. I will now try to explain this point. 
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We saw earlier that the formal structure of the intentional state, S(p), 
looks a lot like the formal structure of the corresponding speech act, F(p). But 
F(p) represents an intentional act, and in the cases we are considering it 
represents an act deliberately performed in accordance with the conventions of 
a socially accepted language. Recall that the essence of speaker meaning is the 
intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction onto utterances, the 
imposition of the same conditions of satisfaction as the intentional state 
expressed in the utterance. Thus, if I believe that it is raining and I want to 
say that it is raining, I express my belief by making an utterance which I 
intend to have the same conditions of satisfaction as the original belief. And 
that utterance inherits the direction of fit of the belief and thus, like the belief, 
the utterance can be true or false. When I say “it is raining”, my utterance has 
the word-to-world direction of fit and will be true or false depending on 
whether or not the propositional content is satisfied. And so on through the 
other cases.  
But now an interesting problem arises concerning the relation between the 
speech act and the corresponding intentional state. The speech act involves a 
commitment that goes far beyond the commitments of the intentional state 
expressed. This is most obvious in the case of statements and promises, but it 
is also true of other sorts of speech acts such as orders and apologies. When I 
make a statement I not only express a belief but I commit myself to its truth. 
When I make a promise I not only express an intention but I commit myself 
to carrying it out. Where do these commitments come from? The belief and 
the intention have nothing like the commitments of the statement or the 
promise. If we are trying to explain the logical, conceptual evolution of a 
language that has statements and promises, it is not enough that we explain 
how a speaker can convey his belief and his intention to the hearer. We need to 
know how the speaker adds these special deontologies to the speech act. It is 
tempting, and indeed true, to say that the constitutive rules of the institutions 
of statement making and promising make every statement into a commitment 
to truth and every promise into an obligation to do something. The rules 
typically have the form “X counts as Y in C.” (For example, making such and 
such an utterance X in this context C counts as making a promise, Y) The 
question is, How do we get the rules? 
Notice that one wrong, but very common, answer, is to think that the 
deontic requirements are somehow external to the type of speech act. First we 
have statement making and then we have a rule that commits us to making 
only true ones; first we have promise making and then we have a rule that 
obligates us to keep the promises. This view of the relation of statements to 
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truth is held by philosophers as diverse as Bernard Williams,(9) Paul 
Grice(10), and David Lewis.(11) But it is not correct. You cannot explain what 
a statement or a promise is without explaining that a statement commits the 
maker of the statement to its truth and the promise commits the maker of the 
promise to carrying it out. In both cases the commitment is internal to the 
type of speech act being performed, where by “internal” I mean it could not be 
the type of speech act it is, it could not be that very kind of speech act if it did 
not have that commitment. But, to repeat the question, how do we evolve the 
deontic power out of the act of meaning something by an utterance? Does the 
act of representing the same conditions of satisfaction as those of a belief 
somehow essentially involve a commitment that goes beyond the commitment 
of the belief, does the action of representing the same conditions of satisfaction 
as an intention necessarily involve a commitment that goes beyond the 
commitment of the intention? Or are these other commitments just add-ons? 
Are they further accretions that come with the historical development of the 
linguistic institutions? I think they are internal. 
To see why, we have to see that the speech act is more than just the 
expression of an intention or the expression of a belief. It is above all a public 
performance. I am telling something to someone else. But I am not just telling 
him that I have a belief or that I have an intention; I am telling him 
something about the world represented by those beliefs and intentions. By 
committing myself to the conditions of satisfaction of the belief I am telling 
him that this is how the world is, by telling him about the conditions of 
satisfaction of my intention I am telling him what I am actually going to do. 
(The self referentiality of promises comes in here. I do not just promise to do 
something, but in so doing, I promise to do it because I promised to do it.). In 
ordinary parlance, I give my word. 
We can summarize this part of our discussion as follows. In evolving a 
language we found that we needed speaker meaning, conventions and internal 
syntactic structure. But if you understand these as relating in a certain way to 
human intentionality, you can see the different types of illocutionary acts and 
in so doing, you already get the commitments that typically go with those 
types of illocutionary acts. Nothing further is necessary to guarantee that 
speakers will be committed by their utterances. In following the common sense 
idea that language could have evolved, and may in fact have evolved, out of 
prelinguistic forms of intentionality we found that language so evolved 
provides something not present in pre linguistic intentionality, the public 
assumption of commitments. 
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12. The Extension of Deontology to Social Reality. How Language Enables Us to 
Create Social Institutions 
 
The argument given so far is that intentional acts of meaning, that is the 
intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction, performed according to accepted conventions and with the 
intention that they should so accord, necessarily involve a deontology. Now, 
once that deontology is collectively created by these intentional actions, then 
it is very easy, indeed practically inevitable that it should be extended to 
social reality generally. So, once you have the capacity to represent, then you 
already have the capacity to create a reality that consists in part of 
representations. Let me give some examples of this. If you have the capacity 
to say “He is our leader.” “He is my man.” “She is my woman.” “This is my 
house,” then you have the capacity to do something more than represent pre-
existing states of affairs. You have the capacity to create states of affairs with 
a new deontology; you have the capacity to create rights, duties and 
obligations by performing and getting other people to accept certain sorts of 
speech acts. Once you and others recognize someone as a leader, and an object 
as someone’s property, and a man or a woman as someone with whom you 
have a special bond, then you have already created a public deontology. You 
have already created public reasons for action that are desire independent. But 
notice the functioning of the language that we use to describe these 
phenomena. It creates them. The language constitutes them in an important 
way. Why? Because the phenomena in question only are what they are in 
virtue of being represented as what they are. The representations which are 
partly constitutive of institutional reality, the reality of government, private 
property, marriage as well as money, universities and cocktail parties, is 
essentially linguistic. The language doesn’t just describe; it creates, and partly 
constitutes what it describes. 
Compositionality figures essentially in the creation of social and 
institutional reality. Given compositionality the animal can do much more 
than just represent existing states of affairs; it can represent states of affairs 
that do not exist but which can be brought into existence by getting a 
community to accept a certain class of speech acts.. So, for example, the man 
who says “This is my property” or the woman who says “This is my 
husband,” may be doing more than just reporting an antecedently existing 
state of affairs, they may be creating a state of affairs by declaration. A person 
who can get other people to accept this declaration will succeed in creating an 
institutional reality that did not exist prior to that declaration.  
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We do not yet have performatives, because they require specific 
performative verbs or other performative expressions, but we do have 
declarations with their double direction of fit. If I declare, “This is my 
property” then I represent myself has having a right to the property (word-to-
world direction of fit) and, if I get others to accept my representation then I 
create that right because the right only exists by collective acceptance (world-
to-word direction of fit). And they are not independent: I create a right by 
representing myself as already having it. 
This basic move underlies much of society. It is not easy to see this point 
but I think it is essential to understanding society. The utterance creates 
desire-independent reasons for action, and these are then recognized by the 
collectivity. That same move, that same X-counts-as-Y-in-context-C move, by 
which you create desire-independent reasons for action in the case of the 
individual speech act, is now generalizable. So what we think of as private 
property, for example, is a kind of standing speech act. It is a kind of 
permanent speech act affixed to an object. It says, the owner of this object has 
certain rights and duties, and other people, not the owners of this object, do 
not have those rights and duties. And think of money as a kind of standing 
permanent speech act. (Sometimes the speech act is written out. On American 
currency it says: “This note is legal tender for all debts public and 
private.”).(12) 
I have throughout this article been drawing attention to several 
remarkable features of human language. None is more remarkable than this: 
In human languages we have the capacity, not only to represent reality, both 
how it is and how we want to make it be, but we have the capacity to create a 
new reality by representing that reality as existing. We create private 
property: money, property, government, marriage, and a thousand other such 
phenomena by representing these phenomena as existing.  
 
 
13. Summary of the Argument So Far 
 
There are three essential points I want to get across in this article in addition 
to the analysis of relations of nonlinguistic to linguistic intentionality. First I 
want to emphasize how the structure of prelinguistic intentionality enables us 
to solve the problems of the relation of reference and predication and the 
problem of the unity of the proposition. The second point is about deontology.
 The basic intellectual motivation that drives this second part of my 
argument is the following: There is something left out of the standard 
textbook accounts of language as consisting of syntax, semantics and 
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phonology with an extra-linguistic pragmatics thrown in. Basically what is 
left out is the essential element of commitment involved in having a set of 
conventional devices that encode the imposition of conditions of satisfaction 
on conditions of satisfaction. The third part of the article is about the creation 
of a social and institutional ontology by linguistically representing certain 
facts as existing, thus creating the facts. When we understand this third point 
we will get a deeper insight into the constitutive role of language in the 
construction of society and social institutions. Let me review the steps of the 
argument so that it is as clear as I can make it. 
Step 1. We imagine a race of beasts capable of consciousness and pre-
linguistic intentionality. And, of equal importance, they are endowed with a 
capacity for free action and collective intentionality. They can cooperate and 
they have free will.  
Step 2. We have to assume that they are capable of evolving procedures for 
representing states of affairs; where the representations have speaker meaning, 
as I have defined it. They can represent states of affairs that they believe 
exist, states of affairs they desire to exist, states of affairs they intend to bring 
about, etc.  
Step 3. These procedures, or at least some of them, become 
conventionalized. What does that mean exactly? It means that given 
collective intentionality, if anyone intentionally engages in one of these 
procedures, then other members of the group have a right to expect that the 
procedures are being followed correctly. This, I take it, is the essential thing 
about conventions. Conventions are arbitrary, but once they are settled they 
give the participants a right to expectations 
Step 4. We can also imagine that they break up the representations into 
repeatable and manipulatable components that perform the functions of 
reference and predication.  
Step 5. The central idea in the argument is this: Just having a belief or a 
desire or an intention does not so far commit a person in any public way. Of 
course, a belief is a commitment to truth and a desire is a commitment to 
satisfaction and an intention is a commitment to action, but none of these so 
far are public undertakings. There is no deontology involved, no publicly 
recognized obligation. But once you freely commit yourself to the conditions 
of satisfaction of these corresponding intentional states and you do this in a 
public way by imposing conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction, 
and you do it according to the conventions of a tribe, then you have a system 
for creating obligations and other sorts of deontic commitments. Notice that 
the commitment is to states of affairs in the world and not just to the 
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corresponding intentional states. Thus if I make a statement I commit myself 
to the existence of a fact, if I make a promise I commit myself to the 
performance of a future action, and so on. 
Step 6. The same basic linguistic move that enables speech acts to carry a 
deontology of rights, duties, commitments, etc. can be extended to create a 
social and institutional reality of money, government, marriage, private 
property and so on. And each of these is a system of deontologies. Once we 
introduce the elements of compositionality and generativity into language 
there is literally no limit to the institutional realities we can create just by 
agreeing, in language, that we are creating them. We create universities, 
cocktail parties and summer vacations, for example. The limits on 
institutional power are the limits on deontology itself. Deontic powers are 
powers that exist only because they are recognized and accepted as existing. 
Sometimes we back them with physical force, in the case of the criminal law 
for example, but the police and armies are also systems of deontologies. 
 
 
 
14. Why Standard Semantic Theories Fail to Account for These Features 
 
I have now completed the main arguments of this article. In this section and 
the next I will answer some leftover questions.  
I said earlier that traditional accounts of language are unable to get at this 
essential deontic feature. Now, why couldn’t, for example, standard truth 
conditional accounts get at it? The truth conditional accounts that I am 
familiar with make a connection between truth and meaning. What they do 
not see is how that connection is necessarily mediated by commitment. It is 
not enough that there should be a matching or satisfaction relation between 
the sentence or the utterance on the one hand and its truth conditions on the 
other, there must also be a representing relation and the representing relation 
is not explained by a kind of matching or satisfaction. The only way to get the 
representing relation is to see that an utterance with a meaning doesn’t just 
match the truth conditions or is satisfied by the truth conditions but rather is 
a commitment to the existence of those truth conditions. You can see this 
weakness in its most extreme form in the case of the picture theory of 
meaning. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is the classic statement of this view. The 
problem is that if we are to try to think of the sentence as a picture of a fact, 
where picturing is defined in terms of the isomorphism of the structure of the 
picture and the structure of the corresponding fact, then equally the fact is a 
picture of the sentence. Isomorphism is a symmetrical relation: If A is 
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isomorphic to B, then B is isomorphic to A. If this sentence is somehow or 
other a structural model of the fact, then the fact is equally a structural model 
of the sentence, and we have lost the representing relation which is essential to 
language. Now, oddly enough, a similar difficulty affects Tarski-style model 
theoretic accounts such as Davidson’s, because if we are to say that the key 
notion is satisfaction, and we can explain satisfaction recursively, then the 
problem is that if an object satisfies an open sentence, then there must be a 
relation in   which the open sentence stands to the object, the relation of 
being satisfied by that object. But neither of these, neither satisfier of nor 
satisfied by, gives us representation or commitment. The particular form of 
asymmetry that is required between the representation and the thing 
represented essentially involves a commitment on the part of the speech act to 
the existence of the state of affairs represented. It is not enough to present 
language and reality as simply staring at each other blankly. Language is used 
to represent reality and the notion of representation essentially involves more 
than the notions of truth or matching, or satisfaction. It is involves the notion 
of a commitment to truth or satisfaction. 
 
 
15. Why Language is Essentially Conventional and Why There Are so Many 
Different Languages 
 
If language is biologically based, then why is it that we speak so many 
different languages? If evolutionary biology gave us the capacity for language, 
why did it not give us a single language which all humans could speak? 
Humans have, with minor variations, the same way of seeing because they all 
have the same visual apparatus, but they certainly do not have the same way 
of speaking. Why not? The answer derives in part from the fact that speaking 
is a voluntary activity, perhaps the most paradigmatic form of the human 
freedom of the will, and where free voluntary actions are concerned, people 
perform these actions in their own free voluntary ways. Biology can give us a 
basis for talk, but it is up to us how we talk, and it is up to us what we say.  
Suppose there had been exactly one primordial language with its own 
syntax and lexicon. We know from historical linguistics that it would have 
evolved into different dialects, all of which would be conventional. Even if 
everyone tries as hard as they can to imitate what they take to be the 
“correct” way of speaking, variations are bound to emerge. In a sense the 
Roman Empire gave its subjects a common language, but over two thousand 
years they evolved into contemporary, mutually incomprehensible, French, 
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Portuguese, Spanish, Romantsch, etc. So even assuming one biologically 
determined language, the free will of language speakers would have evolved 
the Ursprache into any number of conventional dialects, where 
“conventional” implies both arbitrariness and normativity. There is a right 
way and a wrong way to speak any language, but the way that the language 
fixed rightness and wrongness is conventional and therefore arbitrary. 
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